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This paper characterizes the optimal contract designed by a profit-maximizing monopolist, who can 
provide an indivisible and excludable public good to a group of n potential consumers, whose 
valuations are private information. The analysis takes distribution costs  and congestion effects into 
account.  The second-best allocation rule, which is welfare-maximizing under the constraint of non-
negative profits, is characterized. Properties of the optimal mechanism in the case of many 
potential consumers are analyzed and it is shown that in this case the monopolist can use simple 
posted-price contracts.  Finally, implications for public intervention are discussed. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Several years ago Burns and Walsh (1981) observed a growing interest in the private provision of 
commodities known as price-excludable public goods or joint goods. These commodities possess 
the characteristic of non-rivalness in consumption, "so that all consumers simultaneously may 
consume the total production", but "price exclusion is possible, and in the limit costless, just as for 
conventional private goods" (Brennan and Walsh (1985)). 
 
Examples of such goods are abundant. Some of the earliest papers dealt with the private 
provision of subscription TV1. Other examples of  varying purity include computer software; 
recreational facilities such as parks, theatres and museums; trips by planes, trains and buses; or at a 
more general level R&D and the creation of information. 
 
It is interesting to note that Samuelson (1958) repeatedly emphasized that such goods are 
quite different from "true-blue private goods". According to him the possibility of scrambling a TV 
signal does not enable us to convert a public good into a private good, because the marginal costs 
of having one extra person tune in on the program are still zero. Samuelson (1964) pointed out that 
even if  exclusion  is  possible  "we  should  still  be  faced  with  an instance of intrinsic increasing 
returns and that in all such cases there is an element of the public good dilemma".2 
 
Modern formalizations of the public good dilemma for the case of pure public goods include 
Güth and Hellwig (1986), Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). We investigate whether 
their strong  inefficiency  results also prevail in an excludable public goods framework and clarify 
the relations to models of monopolistic supply of private goods (cf. Bulow and Roberts (1989), 
Cairns (1993) and Cornelli (1996)). By doing so, this note ties up a few loose ends and thus 
attempts to fill some small gaps in that literature. 
 
Our analysis is related to earlier contributions to the literature on excludable public goods in 
several ways. Contradicting Buchanan (1967), Auster (1977) claimed that a perfectly 
discriminating monopolist would not produce an optimal output of an excludable public good. 
Brennan and Walsh (1985) showed that this claim is not correct, given that the monopolist knows 
the preferences of the consumer(s). It is however exactly  this  assumption that has been sharply 
criticized by Samuelson (1967). He said that a perfectly discriminating monopolist  "is just another 
name for God", because the consumers have incentives not to reveal their true  preferences.3  This 
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important observation is a starting point of our analysis: We abandon the assumption that the 
monopolist has perfect information4   about the consumers' preferences. 
 
Brito and Oakland (1980) convincingly argue why we should be interested in the  
monopolistic provision of excludable public goods and also take the privacy of information into 
account. However, their analysis is restrictive, because they only consider simple posted-price 
mechanisms, i.e. there are exogenous constraints on the class of contracts that the monopolist can 
offer to the consumers. In contrast, we do not impose any such constraints on the class of 
admissible contracts. Moreover, we explicitly allow for 'impure' cases of  excludable public goods 
in two ways: We consider the existence of distribution costs5  in addition to production costs and 
we consider 'congestion effects' by limiting the number of agents to whom the public good can be 
provided. 
 
Our analysis is also related to the recent literature on contract theory.6  Hart and Holmström 
(1987) pointed out that optimal contracts are often very complicated, if there are no ad-hoc 
constraints on the class of admissible contracts. On the other hand, contracts in the real world seem 
to be relatively simple. The optimal contracts derived in our model are indeed more complicated 
than the simple posted-price contracts analyzed by Brito and Oakland (1980).  From a contract-
theoretic point of view,  it is thus desirable to explain why actual contracts often have a simple 
structure, without imposing this structure as an ad-hoc assumption. We therefore show that the 
monopolist can indeed choose a very simple contract if the number of potential consumers 
converges to infinity. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the basic setup. In section 3 we 
characterize the monopolist's profit-maximizing production and selling decision. The second-best 
allocation rule, which is obtained by maximizing social welfare under the constraint  of  non-
negative profits, is characterized in section 4. In section 5 we analyze properties of the optimal 
contract, given that the number of potential consumers converges to infinity. Implications for 
public intervention are discussed in section 6.  Finally, we conclude with some remarks on possible 
modifications and extensions. 
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II.   The  model 
 
There are n  potential consumers who may enjoy the benefits of an indivisible, excludable public 
good. Let }1,0{∈iq  denote the quantity consumed by agent },...,1{ ni∈ .  The allocation of  the 
public good is thus given by a vector ),...,( 1 nqqq = . Let iv  denote agent i 's privately known 
willingness-to-pay (or valuation) for the public good. The valuations are independent random 
variables distributed according to commonly  known  cumulative distribution functions iF . The 
support of a corresponding density function if  is given by the interval +⊂= RvvV iii ],[ . The 
valuations of the n  potential consumers are thus denoted  by a vector ∏∈= in Vvvv ),...,( 1 . The 
following standard assumption restricts our attention  to  what  Myerson (1981) has called the 
"regular case": 
 
 
Assumption 1. The term 
)(
)(1
ii
ii
i vf
vFv −−  is increasing in iv . 
                              
For reasons which will become clear later, the term in assumption 1 can be called agent i 's 
"virtual willingness-to-pay". The assumption simplifies the analysis considerably from a technical 
point of view; it is satisfied by many distribution  functions,  including the uniform, normal and 
exponential distributions. 
 
 A monopolist (referred to as agent 0) can produce }1,0{∈Q  units of  the public good by 
incurring costs 0≥KQ . She derives no intrinsic utility from the public good. Note that we must 
have Qqi ≤  i∀ , with the strict inequality holding whenever exclusion is exercised. When the 
monopolist provides the good  to  agent i ,  distribution  costs 0≥ic  arise.  For technological 
reasons (congestion effects) the public good  can be  provided to no more than },...,2,1{ nn ∈  
agents,  so that nqi ≤∑  must be satisfied.  The following assumption says that in order to qualify 
as a potential consumer, an agent's maximal willingness-to-pay must be larger than the distribution 
cost and furthermore restricts our attention to the non-trivial case in which production might 
actually be efficient: 
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Assumption 2. ii vc ≤ , ∑∑ ≤+ ii vcK . 
The monopolist can propose a complicated contract in order to specify the levels of 
production, distribution and payments. Since the monopolist derives no intrinsic utility from the 
public good, we can focus on the choice of q , which automatically determines Q  by 
},...,max{)( 1 nqqqQ = . Moreover, we know from the revelation principle that we can restrict our 
attention to direct revelation mechanisms: The potential consumers are asked to report their 
valuations. The announcements of the agents determine who may consume the public good by the 
allocation rule ∏ → niVq }1,0{:  and who has to pay how much to the monopolist by the transfer 
rule ∏ +→ ni RVx : . 
 
The expected utility of potential consumer i  given his valuation iv  and the mechanism ))(),(( vxvq  
s defined by )}()({)( vxvqvvU iiiiii −Ε= − . 
The incentive-compatibility and individual rationality constraints are:7 
(IC)   )}~,()~,({)( iiiiiiiiii vvxvvqvvU −−− −Ε≥  ivv ii ,~,∀  
(IR)     0)( ≥ii vU   ivi ,∀    
Given the constraints (IC) and (IR) the monopolist chooses functions )(vq  and )(vx  in order 
to maximize his expected profits, which are given by the difference between the expected total 
surplus and the rents of the potential consumers, })()()({))((0 ∑∑ −−−Ε= iiiii vUKQvqcvvqU . 
Finding a solution to this problem is considerably simplified by the following three lemmas. The 
proofs are by now standard and can easily be adapted from Myerson (1981). 
 
Lemma 1:  The constraints (IC) are equivalent to the following two conditions: 
(1)  )}~,({ iiii vvq −−Ε  is increasing in iv~   ivi ,~∀  
(2)  ∫ −−Ε+= i
i
v
v
iiiiiiiii vvvqvUvU ~d )}~,({)()(  ivi ,∀  
 
Note that as long as )(vx leads to a given value of )( ii vU , expression (2) does not depend on 
the transfer rule )(vx . As a consequence, the expected profits ))((0 vqU  are also independent of 
)(vx .  Indeed,  using lemma 1 and partial integration it is easy to prove the following result. 
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Lemma 2: Given an incentive-compatible mechanism ))(),(( vxvq , the expected profits of the 
monopolist are 
(3) ∑∑ −⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−Ε= )()(
)(
)(1))((0 iiii
ii
ii
i vUKQvqcvf
vFvvqU . 
 
Given that due to (IR) the expected utility of a consumer must not be negative,  and given that 
)( ii vU  is increasing in iv  due to lemma 1, the monopolist will choose )(vx  so that 0)( =ii vU . 
Given this restriction on the class of transfer rules, )(vx  does no longer influence the monopolist's 
profits. We can thus restrict our search for an optimal contract to the choice of an allocation rule 
)(vq . The following lemma specifies a suitable transfer rule. 
 
 
Lemma 3: An allocation rule which satisfies condition (1) can be paired with the following transfer 
rule, so that the resulting mechanism meets (IC) and (IR) and leads to 0)( =ii vU : 
 
(4)   ∫ −−= i
i
v
v
iiiiiii vvvqvqvvx ~d )~,()()(  
 
 
Note that the fact that in the above mentioned sense the expected profits are independet of the 
concrete specification of  )(vx  is reminiscent of Myerson's (1981) "revenue equivalence" result in 
auction theory. 
 
 
 
III.    Profit- maximization 
 
Consider first the contract a monopolist would propose if she knew the valuations of the 
consumers. In this case the profit of the monopolist would obviously be given by the social surplus 
KQqcv iii −−∑ )(  minus the sum of the consumer rents ∑ − )( iii xqv . The monopolist could 
extract the consumer rents by setting iii qvx = . If nn = , she would thus maximize profits by 
setting 1=iq  if  (a) ii cv ≥  and (b) Kcv ii ≥−∑ }0),max{( , and  0=iq  otherwise. If  nn < , only 
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the n  consumers with the highest values of  ii cv −  would be considered and q  would be chosen in 
an analogous way. The monopolist would thus implement the first-best allocation rule, absorbing 
the total surplus through perfect price-discrimination. 
However, if the consumers have private information, these simple findings are no longer  
true. In order to make the consumers reveal their true valuations, the monopolist must  pay  them 
information rents.  This fact is reflected by the additional term )(/))(1( iiii vfvF−  in expression 
(3). We now understand why iv  minus this term can be called "virtual willingness-to-pay". If only 
the true willingness-to-pay iv  appeared in (3), the monopolist could implement the first-best and 
absorb the total surplus. But due to the privacy of  information,  this is no longer possible.  The 
willingness-to-pay is distorted by a term which arises because of the need to provide the consumers 
with sufficient incentives to reveal their types. 
 
The following proposition characterizes the allocation rule which a rational, profit 
maximizing monopolist will choose. Although this contract appears to be very complex, it is a 
straightforward generalization of the optimal contract in a perfect information environment, which 
we have just described. 
 
 
Proposition 1. Define )(vM as the set of indices },..,1{,...,1 njj n ∈  corresponding to the n  largest8 
elements of  ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ∈−−− },...,1{)(
)(1
njc
vf
vF
v j
jj
jj
j . 
Define )(
)(
)(1
:)( vMc
vf
vF
vjvM j
jj
jj
j ∩⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ≥−−= . 
The monopolist maximizes profits by choosing ))(),...,(()( 1 vqvqvq
M
n
MM = , with9  
(5) 1)( =vqMi  iff )(vMi∈  and Kcvf
vF
v
vMj
j
jj
jj
j ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−∑
∈ )( )(
)(1
. 
 
Proof. Recall that Q  is given by },...,max{)( 1 nqqqQ = . All we have to do is thus to choose 
)(vqi  in order to maximize (3) subject to (1) and nqi ≤∑ . As a first step,  ignore the side 
constraints.  The monopolist maximizes (3) by setting 1=iq  for those consumers, whose virtual 
willingness-to-pay exceeds the distribution costs, given that the production costs can be covered. If 
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nn < , only the n  consumers with the highest virtual valuations minus distribution costs are 
considered. Finally, we must check that condition (1) is satisfied. This is obviously the case, 
because due to assumption 1 the virtual willingness-to-pay and thus )(vqMi  is increasing in iv . 
Q.E.D. 
 
If nn = , i.e. if there are no congestion effects, )(vM  equals the set of all agents },...,1{ n , 
and )(vM  is simply the set of those agents whose virtual willingness-to-pay is at least as large as 
the relevant  distribution  cost. Agents who do not fall in this category never get a chance to  enjoy 
the benefits of the public good. Agents who do fall in this category may consume the public good, 
but only if the total virtual willingness-to-pay of these agents net of distribution costs is large 
enough to cover the production costs K . If nn < , the set )(vM  is further restricted so that only 
the n  consumers with the highest virtual willingness-to-pay net of distribution costs are 
considered.10 
 
Note that for the special case 0=K , cci =  i∀  and nn < ,  proposition 1 reproduces the 
optimal multiple goods auction as described by Bulow and Roberts (1989) and Cairns (1993), while 
the special case 0>K , FFi =  i∀ , 0=ic  i∀  and nn =  corresponds to Cornelli (1996). 
Obviously there are strong analogies between selling strategies for private goods on the one hand 
and excludable public goods on the other hand. In contrast, the following remark refers to the case 
of pure public goods, i.e. the case in which all consumers  must consume the same amount, because 
exclusion is impossible. 
 
Remark.  Consider  the  case 0...1 === ncc , nn = , and  impose  the  additional constraint 
ji qq =  ji,∀ . In this case, a profit-maximizing monopolist chooses 
(6)  1)( =vqMi  iff Kvf
vF
v
jj
jj
j ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−∑ )(
)(1
. 
The proof of this result is straightforward given lemma 1  (see Güth and Hellwig (1986) and Rob 
(1989)). We will come back to this result in section 5. 
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IV.  Welfare 
 
In the trivial case 0=K  and nn = , the first-best allocation rule is given by 1)( =vqi  iff ii cv ≥ . 
This rule can be implemented by posting personal prices ic  and obviously leads to zero profits if 
0=iv  i∀ . With 0>K  it can thus happen that a monopolist would make negative profits if she 
were forced to choose the first-best allocation rule.11  If public funds to subsidize the monopolist 
can only be raised by introducing distortions,  even a welfare-maximizing government could not 
achieve the first best in this case.  We therefore characterize the second-best allocation rule, which 
is welfare-maximizing under the condition of non-negative expected profits. 
 
Proposition 2. For a given 0≥λ , define )(vL  as the set of indices },..,1{,...,1 njj n ∈   
corresponding to the n  largest elements of ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ∈−−+− },...,1{)(
)(1
1
njc
vf
vF
v j
jj
jj
j λ
λ . 
Define )(
)(
)(1
1
:)( vLc
vf
vF
vjvL j
jj
jj
j ∩⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ≥−+−= λ
λ . Define )(vqλ  in the following way: 
(7)  1)( =vqiλ  iff )(vLi∈  and Kcvf
vF
v
vLj
j
jj
jj
j ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+−∑∈ )( )(
)(1
1 λ
λ  
 
There exists 0~ ≥λ , so that }0))((inf{~ 0 ≥= vqU λλλ . The second-best allocation rule is given by  
))(),...,(()( 1 vqvqvq
S
n
SS =  with )()( ~ vqvq iSi λ= . 
 
Proof. Maximization of social surplus under the constraint of non-negative expected profits is 
equivalent to the maximization of the following Lagrangian: 
(8) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−+−− ∑∑ KQvqcvf vFvKQvqcv iiii iiiiii )()(
)(1)()( λ  
 
Dividing by λ+1  and re-arranging terms, we see that the maximizer of this Lagrangian is equal to 
the maximizer of the following expression: 
 
(9)  ∑ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+− KQvqcvf
vFv iii
ii
ii
i )()(
)(1
1 λ
λ  
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By arguments similar to those in the proof of proposition 1, it is now easy to see that this 
expression is maximized by )(vqi
λ . Note that for nn = , 0=ic  i∀ , the second-best allocation rule 
for excludable public goods is similar to the one for non-excludable public goods, which has 
already been analysed by Güth and Hellwig (1986). The existence of  λ~  can therefore be 
established by a straightforward modification of their lemma 5.5.                                               
 Q.E.D. 
 
 
It is not surprising that proposition 2 is affiliated to results  that  were earlier obtained for 
non-excludable public goods, while proposition 1 is more similar to results of the private goods 
literature. A welfare-maximizer has less intention to exclude any agents,  as long as congestion 
effects and distribution costs do not force her to do so.  On the other hand,  the possibility of 
exclusion certainly is important. There is indeed a fundamental difference between the allocation 
rules (5) and (6), which will become clear when we consider the case of many consumers. 
 
 
 
V.   Many   consumers 
 
The monopolist's profit-maximizing behavior as derived in proposition 1 is characterized by 
two properties, which deserve further considerations. First, the optimal contract must be written 
before production takes place. Second, the optimal contract is more complex than a simple fixed 
price mechanism. In this section we demonstrate that when the number of consumers converges to 
infinity, the monopolist can write a simple contract after production, and we thus provide a 
foundation for models which assume a continuum of consumers, such as Chae (1990). For 
simplicity, from now on we assume that FFi =  i∀ , cci =  i∀ , and nn = . The optimal allocation 
rule according to proposition 1 is then given by 1)( =vqMi  iff 
(10)  (a) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −+≥=∈
)(
)(1
)(
j
j
j vf
vF
cvjvMi  and  (b) Kc
vf
vF
v
vMj j
j
j ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−∑
∈ )( )(
)(1
. 
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First note that if condition (b) in (10) were satisfied with probability one, the profit-maximizing 
allocation rule would be given by 1=iq  iff cvf
vF
v
i
i
i ≥
−−
)(
)(1
 . It is straightforward to see that this 
rule can easily be implemented by simply setting a fixed price. Moreover, if n  converges to 
infinity and K  remains finite, condition (b) indeed will be trivially satisfied with probability one. It 
is therefore more interesting to compare economies of different sizes, when K  also increases with 
n . We choose the same normalization as Rob (1989) and assume that nK κ= , with )1,0(∈κ . 
 
Proposition 3. If the number of potential consumers converges to infinity, the monopolist in the 
limit cannot improve upon the following simple mechanism: 
The monopolist chooses 1=Q  if and only if κ  is not larger than the expected profit which she 
could make using the optimal mechanism of proposition 1 in the case of one consumer and 0=K . 
Then the monopolist sets the same price as she would set in the case 1=n , 0=K . 
 
Proof. Note that 
(11a)  ∞→nlim  Prob 1)(
)(1
)(
=⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−∑
∈
nc
vf
vF
v
vMj j
j
j κ  
(11b)  ⇔  κ≥⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−Ε ∑
∈∞→ )( )(
)(11lim
vMj j
j
jn
c
vf
vF
v
n
 
(11c)  ⇔  κ≥⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−Ε c
vf
vF
v
i
i
i )(
)(1
,0max . 
 
The left-hand side of the last inequality is the monopolist's expected profit for 0=K  and 1=n , as 
can easily be seen from (3) and (5). So whenever this expression is larger than κ , condition (b) in 
(10) will in the limit be satisfied with probability one. In this case, the monopolist will produce  the 
public good. It is straightforward to see  that the optimal mechanism for the case 0=K , 1=n  can 
easily be implemented by simply posting a price.                      
 Q.E.D. 
 
Note that our result sharply contrasts with the findings of Rob (1989) and Mailath and 
Postlewaite (1990) who consider non-excludable public goods. They show that if iv>κ , the 
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probability of provision converges to zero for ∞→n . Indeed, from the remark in section 3 we 
know that the allocation rule in the case of pure public goods is given by 
(12)  1)( =vqMi  iff κnvf
vF
v
i
i
i ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−∑ )(
)(1
. 
 
The probability that this condition is satisfied converges to zero for ∞→n , since 
(13)   κ<=⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ −−Ε i
i
i
i vvf
vF
v
)(
)(1
. 
This shows that non-excludability, i.e. the additional restriction ji qq =  ji,∀ , is responsible for the 
negative results of Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), but not the fact that public 
goods in the sense of Samuelson (1964) are considered. 
 
 
 
VI.  Implications  for  public  intervention 
 
So far it has been assumed that the excludable public good is provided by a profit-maximizing 
monopolist. It is useful to discuss in more detail the role of the public sector. As has been argued in 
section 3, if there were no private information, then the monopolist would choose the first-best 
allocation rule since he could absorb the total surplus through perfect price-discrimination. This 
means that if there were no  private  information,  intervention  of  the government could only be 
justified by distributional concerns. 
 
However, we have seen that if there is private information, a monopolist will deviate from the 
first-best allocation rule in order to maximize his profits. There may hence be efficiency reasons for 
government intervention. It is then natural to ask whether the excludable public good should be 
provided by the public sector or whether the government should intervene through regulation 
(which means subsidization in the case where the non-negative profit constraint binds). Since the 
analysis presented in this paper derives from the more general literature on the theory of complete 
contracts, one cannot expect to get a clear answer  to this question.  Indeed, it is a well-known fact 
that if comprehensive contracts can be written, it is always possible to implement the same 
outcome in both organizational modes (see Schmidt (1996), p. 2, and Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), p. 1128). Hence, from a contract-theoretic point of view, the costs and benefits of public 
 13
provision versus regulation can only be understood if only incomplete contracts in the sense of 
Grossman and Hart (1986) are feasible. 
 
For example, assume that the cost structure is initially only known to the agent responsible 
for the production of the excludable public good. This can now either be the manager of a private 
enterprise or a public employee. Following Shapiro and Willig (1990), it may make sense to 
assume that the government has better access to information of public employees.  Indeed, access 
to the monopolist's inside information may be a residual right of control in the sense of Grossman 
and  Hart (1986).  In  this case, if the government is a welfare-maximizer,  public provision is 
certainly optimal. However, regulation may be optimal if  the government is not always benevolent.  
In this case, giving the government less information may be better since this reduces the 
government's possibilities to pursue its private agenda (cf. Shapiro and Willig (1990)). 
 
It can certainly be misleading to model the government as a benevolent, unitary decision-
maker. For example, in the real world there are conflicts of interest between politicians, ministries, 
and regulatory agencies  (see Tirole (1994)). Hence, further research along the lines of incomplete 
contracting is clearly desirable in order to better understand the role of the public sector in the 
provision of excludable public goods. 
 
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
We have characterized the optimal behavior of a profit-maximizing monopolist who can provide an 
excludable public good to a group of n  potential consumers,  who have private information with  
regard to their valuations. 
 
Several aspects deserve further  investigation.  We have simplified the analysis by assuming 
that the public good is indivisible.  A more general model would take continuous quantities into 
consideration, at the expense of tractability.  We have also made the simplifying assumptions of the 
independent private valuations framework. The analysis certainly becomes far more complicated 
when correlated valuations are considered. Moreover, the mechanism design approach can be 
criticized.  We assumed that the monopolist can commit himself not to renegotiate after the 
consumers have revealed their information, and we have ruled out the possibility of coalitional 
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manipulations. Finally, our approach belongs to the Bayesian literature. It is of course questionable 
whether it is appropriate to make excessive use of the assumption that the distribution functions are 
common knowledge.12 
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Footnotes 
 
1 See Minasian (1964), Samuelson (1964, 1967) and Buchanan (1967). 
 
2 Demsetz (1970) uses the term 'collective goods' for non-excludable public goods. The 
property of  non-rivalness in consumption is also known as 'supply jointness' or 
'undepletability', cf. Baumol and Ordover (1977). 
 
3  Samuelson (1967) continues: "For Him to look into the hearts of 200 million, or 20 thousand, 
or 2 consumers, and guess right requires miracles." 
 
4  For a recent contribution to the literature on excludable public goods under the assumption of 
perfect information see Bigman (1992). 
 
5  Distribution costs arise with each additional consumer who is permitted to enjoy the benefits 
of the public good. Such costs have also been considered by Chae (1992) in a more recent 
application to subscription TV. 
 
6  See Hart and Holmström (1987) or Schweizer (1996). 
 
7  As long as the agents cannot leave the economy, it is not necessary to consider mechanisms 
in that certain types choose not to participate, because one could instead use equivalent 
mechanisms in which everyone participates and the types that did not participate in the 
original mechanisms have to pay nothing. 
 
8  A tie occurs with probability zero. In this case, choose randomly among the largest elements. 
 
9  We adopt the convention that " 1)( =vq  iff condition C is met" is a shorthand for " 1)( =vq  if 
C is met, whereas 0)( =vq  if C is not met". 
 
10  As an illustration consider a simple example. Assume that there are only 2=n  potential 
consumers,  and that the types of these two agents are uniformly distributed on the unit 
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interval. We further assume that there are no congestion effects ( 2=n ) and that the 
distribution costs are equal to c  for both agents. 
 
In this case the profit-maximizing allocation rule ),( 21 vvq
M  is given by 
  1)( =vqMi  iff 
⎪⎪
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Messy calculations show that the expected profits of the monopolist are: 
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It is easy to see that if 1≥+ cK , the good is produced only if it can be sold to both 
consumers, since even the best type of one consumer alone would not be willing to pay 
enough to cover the costs. However, if 1≤+ cK , there are constellations of 1v  and 2v , so 
that exclusion will be exercised. 
 
11  Recall that the case 0=K , cci =  i∀ , nn < corresponds to the usual private goods auction 
framework. In this case the first-best can be achieved while giving the seller positive 
expected profits, so that a slight increase in K  will generally not lead to negative expected 
profits. Note, however, that (in contrast to what is conjectured in Cornelli, 1996, p.25) in the 
case FFi =  i∀ , 0>> Kvn i , 0== ii vc , nn =  the first-best allocation rule cannot be 
implemented without expected losses for the monopolist. This follows immediately from 
Güth and Hellwig (1986, proposition 5.4). 
 
12  The reader interested in the non-Bayesian literature on (excludable) public goods is referred 
to Moulin (1994) and Deb and Razzolini (1996). 
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